Should water be used as a weapon?

For Preliminary Examination:  Current events of antional and international Significance

For Mains Examination: GS II - International treaties

Context:

All is fair in love and war is a phrase that has literary roots and rhetorical appeal, suggesting that in matters of passion and conflict, rules can be discarded, and morality suspended. But in the realpolitik of nation-states, especially when it comes to shared natural resources, such romantic notions may be specious. Water, unlike territory or ideology, is not merely a symbol of sovereignty — it is a lifeline

Read about:

Indus Waters Treaty (IWT)

International Court of Justice (ICJ)

Key takeaways:

• The Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) was established not due to mutual goodwill, but out of pressing necessity. When British India was divided in 1947, the partition created two nations but left the water systems of the Indus basin split in a problematic way.
• The main control structures, essential for irrigation, ended up in India, while Pakistan, being downstream, depended entirely on the river flow.
• Tensions flared when India temporarily stopped water supply to Pakistan in 1948, prompting regional concerns. It was in this climate that the World Bank intervened, eventually facilitating what is now considered one of the most enduring and effective water-sharing treaties.
• Signed in 1960, the IWT assigned the eastern rivers (Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej) to India, while the western rivers (Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab) were allocated to Pakistan. India was allowed limited use of the western rivers, such as for hydropower generation, under strict design and operational rules. This division reflected both geographical realities and the larger goal of maintaining regional peace.
• The treaty has survived several major conflicts — including the wars of 1965, 1971, and 1999 — as well as periods of severe diplomatic breakdown. Its resilience lies in its technical basis and its separation from political tensions. Even during conflicts, annual meetings between the Permanent Indus Commissions were held.
• The treaty includes a structured dispute resolution process involving bilateral talks, neutral expert assessment, and, when necessary, arbitration — all of which have helped maintain its functionality despite longstanding hostility.
• In recent years, India has increasingly questioned the treaty, particularly after terror attacks such as those in Uri (2016) and Pulwama (2019), which were linked to groups operating from Pakistan. Some Indian political voices began arguing that continuing to honor the treaty was unjustifiable under such conditions, and suggested leveraging water as a strategic tool.
• This rhetoric has emerged alongside India's expanding hydropower initiatives in Jammu and Kashmir, including the Kishanganga and Ratle projects. India asserts these are in line with treaty guidelines, but Pakistan contends that certain design elements could give India undue control over water flow, particularly in dry seasons, which could impact Pakistan’s agriculture and environment.
• Pakistan has responded by invoking the treaty’s adjudication mechanisms. In the Kishanganga case, Pakistan objected to India's water diversion. The Court of Arbitration, formed in 2010, ruled in 2013 that the project could continue, provided India maintained a minimum downstream flow and abided by restrictions on reservoir operations.
• The Ratle project sparked another legal dispute. India preferred addressing the matter through a neutral expert, viewing it as a technical issue, while Pakistan insisted on arbitration
•  In 2016, the World Bank — the treaty’s administrative facilitator — temporarily halted both processes to avoid simultaneous proceedings. However, by 2022, it allowed both avenues to proceed, leading India to reject the arbitration process but participate in the neutral expert mechanism.
• This development is crucial. It reaffirms that the treaty's legal framework remains robust and likely to be activated if India ever attempts to exit the agreement. Rather than strengthening India’s position, a unilateral withdrawal could invite diplomatic backlash, legal consequences, and damage to India’s global standing.
• India has consistently advocated bilateralism in resolving issues with Pakistan, especially since the Simla Agreement of 1972. However, the IWT predates this pact and explicitly includes third-party resolution mechanisms. Neutral experts and arbitrators are not outsiders but are treaty-endorsed roles agreed upon by both nations.
• India's involvement in the Kishanganga and Ratle processes — however reluctant — underscores this fact. Therefore, referencing the Simla Agreement doesn’t invalidate what the IWT permits.
• South Asia isn’t unique in facing inter-state water disputes. Post-World War I Europe saw water-related disagreements, such as between Hungary and Czechoslovakia over the Danube.
• These were largely resolved through the League of Nations. In a more recent example, the Gabčíkovo–Nagymaros dispute between Hungary and Slovakia was settled at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which urged both sides to uphold their treaty commitments.
• The Mekong River conflict in Southeast Asia also shows that cooperation via institutions like the Mekong River Commission, with its emphasis on transparency and information-sharing, can prevent escalation.
• These cases highlight a shared lesson: unilateral actions tend to lead to deadlock or conflict, while legal and diplomatic approaches offer a path to sustainable management of disputes.
• Unilaterally exiting the IWT would likely provoke international criticism and damage India's reputation as a reliable regional leader — particularly as it seeks greater global influence.
• The World Bank, as the treaty’s facilitator, may also be compelled to step in diplomatically or even legally. Such a move could also worry neighboring countries like Nepal and Bangladesh, complicating regional water cooperation.
• Legally, the IWT is binding, with no clause for withdrawal. Under international law — specifically the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties — a unilateral exit is only permissible under exceptional and narrowly defined conditions.
• Moreover, water is not just a strategic resource; it is a fundamental human right. Employing it as a retaliatory tool raises serious ethical concerns. Restricting water flow could harm downstream populations during critical periods.
• Even under the banner of national security, such actions could amount to collective punishment, which breaches moral norms. India's strength lies in upholding a rules-based order, not in weaponizing essential resources.

So, what is the way forward?

India is well within its rights to maximize its usage of the IWT’s allowances, such as constructing hydropower facilities in compliance with the treaty. The Kishanganga and Ratle projects are examples, although the latter remains contested. However, abandoning the treaty would undermine India’s legal and moral high ground and could isolate it diplomatically.

The IWT remains a remarkable example of cooperation in a tense geopolitical relationship. It proves that even bitter rivals can collaborate over vital shared resources like water. Dismantling the treaty would not only reverse decades of diplomatic progress but could also set a dangerous example for managing natural resources in conflict-prone regions

 Follow Up Question

1.Consider the following pairs (2019)

Which of the pairs given above are correctly matched?

(a) 1, 2 and 4

(b) 1, 3 and 4

(c) 2 and 5

(d) 3 and 5