1. Carbon dioxide
2. Carbon monoxide
3. Nitrogen dioxide
4. Sulfur dioxide
5. Methane

Select the correct answer using the code given below:

A. 1, 2 and 3 only     

B. 2, 3 and 4 only   

C. 1, 4 and 5 only     

D. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5

1.Consider the following statements: (UPSC CSE 2020)

1. The weightage of food in Consumer Price Index (CPI) is higher than that in Wholesale Price Index (WPI).
2. The WPI does not capture changes in the prices of services, which CPI does.
3. Reserve Bank of India has now adopted WPI as its key measure of inflation and to decide on changing the key policy rates.

Which of the statements given above is/are correct?

(a) 1 and 2 only
(b) 2 only
(c) 3 only 
(d) 1, 2 and 3

A brief history of the Russia-Ukraine war

For Preliminary Examination:  Current events of national and international importance

For Mains Examination: GS II - International relations

Context:

The Ukraine conflict has witnessed dramatic developments in recent weeks. U.S. President Donald Trump has brought in a 180-degree shift in U.S’s policy towards the war. Disagreements between Kyiv and Washington on how to end the war have led to an unprecedented public spat between Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Mr. Trump in the Oval Office, following which the U.S. paused all military aid for the war-torn European nation

Read about:

U.S.’s policy on Ukraine and NATO

Russia - Ukraine War

Key Takeaways:

The war in Ukraine has seen significant changes in recent weeks. U.S. President Donald Trump has taken a completely different approach to America’s stance on the conflict. Disagreements between Kyiv and Washington over how to end the war led to a rare public dispute between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Trump in the Oval Office. Shortly afterward, the U.S. suspended all military aid to Ukraine. Within a day, Zelenskyy expressed regret over the disagreement and stated that Ukraine was open to a partial truce and working with Trump towards a lasting peace. As the geopolitical landscape shifts rapidly, Europe appears unprepared, while Russia remains observant as the conflict persists.

Origins of the War

When Russian President Vladimir Putin launched the invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, he likely anticipated a swift victory. Western nations, including the U.S., also expected a quick resolution and evacuated their embassies in Kyiv before the war began. However, Ukraine, armed with Western weapons, managed to prevent an early Russian victory. In response, the U.S. under the Biden administration adopted a dual strategy—imposing heavy sanctions on Russia to weaken its economy and military while supplying Ukraine with advanced weaponry. The strategy initially proved effective. By September 2022, Russian forces had retreated from Kharkiv Oblast in the northeast, and in November, they withdrew from Kherson city and parts of Mykolaiv in the south.

Despite these setbacks, Russia escalated its commitment to the war. Putin formally annexed four Ukrainian regions—Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson—and announced partial military mobilization. The Kremlin’s message was clear: Russia was prepared for a prolonged conflict. Economically, Russia shifted its focus to Asia, with major markets such as China and India helping to counterbalance the impact of Western sanctions.

Current Situation on the Battlefield

By 2023, the momentum of the war began shifting in Russia’s favor. Russian forces captured Soledar in January and Bakhmut in May after prolonged battles. By 2024, Russia intensified its offensives, securing Avdiivka in February, Krasnohorivka in September, and Vuhledar in October. Ukraine struggled to reclaim lost territories and its much-anticipated counteroffensive in June 2023, despite the use of advanced Western weapons, ultimately failed against Russia’s fortified defenses.

In August 2024, Ukraine launched a surprise attack, seizing around 1,000 square kilometers of Russian territory in the Kursk region. The objective was to divert Russian troops from eastern Ukraine, where they were advancing. However, Russia did not take the bait and continued pushing forward in the east, targeting Ukraine’s weaker defenses. By the end of 2024, Russian forces had gained an estimated 4,168 square kilometers of territory in Ukraine and parts of Russia’s Kursk region. In January 2025, Russian troops took control of Velyka Novosilka and portions of Toretsk, while also attempting to encircle Pokrovsk.

Although Ukraine has intensified its missile and drone strikes deep into Russian territory and the Black Sea, it has struggled to gain an advantage on the battlefield for over two years.

Trump’s Shift in U.S. Policy on Ukraine

During his presidential campaign, Trump pledged to bring a swift end to the conflict. After assuming office in January, he moved quickly to implement his plan. U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth informed the Ukraine Defense Contact Group—an alliance of 57 countries and the EU that was created to support Kyiv—that Ukraine would not be granted NATO membership. He also stated that the U.S. would not provide security guarantees to Ukraine, and any European assurances would not fall under NATO’s collective defense policy.

Shortly after Hegseth’s remarks, Trump spoke with Putin over the phone. This was followed by two rounds of direct negotiations between Russia and the U.S. Trump appears determined to reset U.S.-Russia relations.

One possible explanation for this shift is that the U.S. no longer considers Russia a major threat. This marks a departure from the post-World War II transatlantic consensus and a return to an earlier strategy—offshore balancing—where America relies on its geographical advantages and avoids deep military entanglements. From this perspective, China is viewed as the primary challenger to U.S. global dominance, and a Sino-Russian alliance could pose a serious risk. To prevent this, Washington may be seeking to repair ties with Moscow—similar to how former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger leveraged the Sino-Soviet split in the 1970s to improve U.S.-China relations. Under this grand strategy, Ukraine becomes a secondary concern. Trump believes Ukraine cannot defeat Russia, even with American support, and wants Kyiv to accept the terms of a U.S.-Russia agreement to end the war.

European Reactions to the Changing U.S. Approach

Europe appears uncertain about how to respond to these developments. When NATO membership was promised to Ukraine in 2008 under U.S. President George W. Bush, both Germany and France were hesitant. Following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its backing of separatists in eastern Ukraine, Germany and France helped broker the Minsk Agreements in an effort to establish peace. However, the U.S. did not fully support these accords and instead continued to provide military assistance to Ukraine.

Since the start of the full-scale war in 2022, European nations have faced severe economic consequences. The destruction of the Nord Stream pipeline—reportedly at the hands of Ukrainian forces, according to American media—severed a key energy link between Russia and Germany. The loss of cheap Russian gas contributed to a cost-of-living crisis and de-industrialization across Europe, fueling political unrest. Germany, for instance, has been in a prolonged economic downturn, and far-right political movements are gaining traction.

Now, as the U.S. pivots toward direct negotiations with Russia while excluding Ukraine and European nations from the process, Europe faces difficult choices. Although European leaders have held high-level meetings since Trump took office and pledged to increase support for Ukraine, the continent remains divided. Without American backing, Europe lacks the capacity to provide Ukraine with meaningful security guarantees. Additionally, Europe is grappling with broader concerns beyond Ukraine, including the future of NATO, as the Trump administration redefines U.S. foreign and security policy.

The Future of Ukraine

Ukraine has lost over 20% of its territory to Russia, with tens of thousands of soldiers killed and millions of citizens displaced. The country’s economy is in turmoil, and its energy infrastructure has suffered repeated Russian attacks. Ukraine remains heavily reliant on external assistance for weapons, ammunition, and other military supplies. However, manpower shortages on the battlefield have become a growing concern. Trump has remarked that Ukraine is “running low on soldiers,” while U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance has pointed out Russia’s overwhelming numerical advantage.

With limited options, Ukraine is in a precarious position. The U.S. has made it clear that it no longer expects Ukraine to reclaim lost territory—an assessment that even Kyiv and its European allies may reluctantly accept. While Ukraine was promised NATO membership in 2008, the U.S. has now ruled out that possibility. Kyiv has sought alternative security guarantees, but Washington remains hesitant to provide them.

If Ukraine chooses to continue the war, it risks further territorial losses. If it agrees to a settlement, the terms will likely be dictated by both Russia and the U.S. Ultimately, Ukraine finds itself in an unenviable position. History has shown that when great powers engage in proxy wars, smaller nations bear the cost. And when great powers decide to realign their interests, their proxies often find themselves sidelined. Ukraine is now facing that harsh reality

Follow Up Question

1.Critically analyze the shifting geopolitical dynamics in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, particularly in light of the United States' evolving stance under the Trump administration. Discuss the implications of this policy shift on Ukraine, Europe, and global power alignments." (250 words)

Three Language Model

For Preliminary Examination:  Current events of national and nternational Importance

For Mains Examination: GS II - Governance

Context:

In 1968, a national education policy (NEP) formulated by the Indira Gandhi-led Congress government had introduced the three-language formula. Centred on a Hindi-English fulcrum, the policy called for teaching a southern language in Hindi-speaking states and a regional language in non-Hindi-speaking states as the third language

Read about: 

National Education Policy (NEP) of 2020

What is the “three-language formula”?

Key takeaways:

• The three-language formula has remained a contentious issue for decades. Tamil Nadu opposed it in 1968 and has since adhered to its own two-language system.
• Currently, the DMK-led Tamil Nadu government and the BJP-led Central government are in disagreement over the National Education Policy (NEP) 2020, which upholds the three-language formula but with more flexibility in language choices. However, the Centre has clarified that no particular language will be enforced on any state.
• Both in 1968 and 2020, the three-language policy aimed to encourage multilingualism. Yet, data from the 2011 Census indicates that in only eight states and union territories does more than half of the population speak more than two languages.
• Nationally, 26.02% of the population is bilingual, while 7.1% speaks three languages. Although bilingualism saw a slight increase from 24.79% in 2001, the percentage of trilingual speakers declined from 8.51%. Between 2001 and 2011, 12 states and UTs experienced a decrease in bilingualism, and 23 recorded a drop in trilingualism.
• Despite maintaining its two-language policy, Tamil Nadu ranked 15th in bilingualism in 2011, with 28.3% of its population speaking two languages. Its trilingual population stood at 3.39%, placing it among the lowest-ranking states.
• Goa led in multilingualism, with 77.21% bilingual and 50.82% trilingual speakers, making it the only state where trilingualism exceeded 50%. Chandigarh (30.51%) and Arunachal Pradesh (30.25%) followed. Other regions with high bilingualism rates included Andaman & Nicobar Islands (67.64%), Arunachal Pradesh (64.03%), Sikkim (63.71%), Nagaland (62.15%), Chandigarh (54.95%), Manipur (54.02%), and Maharashtra (51.1%). The 2011 Census also revealed that Hindi appeared in eight out of the ten most common bilingual language combinations.
• A National Education Policy (NEP) serves as a guiding framework for the country’s education development. The need for such a policy was first recognized in 1964 when Congress MP Siddheshwar Prasad criticized the government for lacking a structured vision for education.
• Consequently, a 17-member Education Commission, led by UGC Chairperson D.S. Kothari, was formed to draft a national education policy, resulting in the adoption of the first NEP in 1968.
• India has had three NEPs so far—the first in 1968 under Indira Gandhi, the second in 1986 under Rajiv Gandhi (revised in 1992 during P.V. Narasimha Rao's tenure), and the third in 2020 under Prime Minister Narendra Modi.
• The NEP primarily serves as a broad framework rather than a mandatory directive. Since education falls under the concurrent list, both the Centre and states have the authority to legislate on it. The government has set a target of 2040 for the complete implementation of NEP 2020